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Not at All:
Environmental Sustainability in the Supreme Court
by James R. May*

T

Introduction

he principle of “sustainability” is soon to mark its 40th
anniversary. It is a concept that has experienced both
evolution and stasis. It has shaken the legal foundation, often engaged, recited, and even revered by policymakers, lawmakers, and academics worldwide. This essay assesses
the extent to which sustainability registers on the scales of the
United States Supreme Court, particularly during the tenure of
Chief Justice John Roberts.
Sustainability entered the general public conscience in 1972
with the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.1
In 1987 it secured center stage when the World Commission on
Environment and Development released its pioneering study,
Our Common Future,2 which defines “sustainable development”
as “development . . . that . . . meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.”3 In 1992 the Earth Summit’s Rio Declaration
declared that sustainable development must “respect the interests of all and protect the integrity of the global environmental
and developmental system.”4 The Rio Declaration’s blueprint
document, Agenda 21, provides that sustainable development
must coincidently raise living standards while preserving the
environment: “[I]ntegration of environment and development
concerns . . . will lead to the fulfillment of basic needs, improved
living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future.”5 The unmistakable
thread that runs through threshold definitions of sustainability is
the interconnectedness of living things, opportunity, and hope.
Recognition of the importance of sustainability has grown
exponentially since the Earth Summit.6 Since then, the concept
of sustainability has been regularly recognized in international
accords,7 by nations in constitutional, legislative and regulatory
reform,8 by States, municipalities and localities in everything
from policy statements to building codes,9 and in corporate mission statements and practices worldwide.10 Sustainability principles are shape-shifters, adaptive to most environmental decision
making, including water and air quality, species conservation,
and national environmental policy in the U.S. and around the
globe.11 Furthermore, it has entered the bloodstream of courts
around the globe as a guiding principle of judicial discretion in
environmental cases.12
There remains one notable bastion still indifferent about if
not immune to sustainability. A situs where the word “sustainability” is never uttered, nor written, nor argued, nor acknowledged: the United States Supreme Court. Forty years on, it
seems reasonable to expect that at least one member of the most
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influential juridical body on the planet would have found a case
or a cause or a controversy befitting a mention of what many
behold as the common denominator in environmental law and
policy, a field well represented before the Court. 13 Yet, this
hasn’t happened. In the roughly 4,000 or so cases the court has
decided during the era of modern environmental law, it has seen
fit to decide about 300 “environmental” cases (those involving
pollution control, natural resources and property management,
and energy).14 More than one-half of these cases involve either
State’s or individual property rights, or disposition of the West’s
mineral, land, and water resources, or both. This is a testament to the southwest-tinged and Barry Goldwater influenced
ideals of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, both of whom were raised in Arizona, and who
together served the court for nearly sixty years. When Rehnquist
and O’Connor left the court in 2005 to their successor urban
brethren from the Northeast, Chief Justice John G. Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito, fair money was that the court’s interest
in environmental cases would wane, diminishing opportunity to
have the Supreme Court engage sustainability.15
Yet the Roberts’ Court has shown more than a passing interest in environmental cases. Chief Justice Roberts’ Court-issued
opinions had something to rejoice or revile for nearly every sustainability enthusiast. The Court decided cases across the environmental spectrum: endangered species, cost recovery, climate
change, air and water pollution, the intersection between two of
environmental law’s most venerated statutes, and the overlap
between local solid waste control efforts and the U.S. Constitution. The Court ruled on the profound, such as whether the Clean
Air Act gives the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
authority to regulate new vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases
that alter the Earth’s climate (yes), and the practical, including
whether it is appropriate to issue a preliminary injunction under
the National Environmental Policy Act to ameliorate the impact
of the Navy’s use of submarine detecting sonar (no), whether
EPA may use cost-benefit analyses when deciding how to protect aquatic life from intake structures (yes), whether an Army
Corps of Engineers’ permit obviates the need to comply with
EPA’s technology based standards under the Clean Water Act (it
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does), whether intent is a qualifying condition for liability as an
“arranger” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (it is), and whether plaintiffs
have standing to challenge a national regulation that authorizes
salvage timber sales (they don’t). Each environmental case saw
a different justice write the majority (and in one case, plurality)
opinion, with opinions by Justice John Paul Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Anthony Kennedy ascendant. Yet, at no
time does anyone mention sustainability.
None of the environmental cases decided thus far during the
tenure of Chief Justice Roberts engage sustainability. The word
“sustainability” does not appear to exist before the Court. It does
not appear in any majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion.
While the Court seems to be agnostic about the idea of sustainability as a governing norm, strong astringent reveals that with
some counterexamples the extent to which decisions before the
Roberts’ Court regarding biodiversity, land use, air pollutant
emissions, and cleanup standards implicate sustainability, they
do so negatively, as discussed below. I conclude that factors
having little or nothing to do with sustainability per se are at
the heart of these results. Yet unless and until parties amass the
courage of their conviction and infuse “sustainability” into litigative lexicon and strategy, sustainability will continue to matter
to the U.S. Supreme Court not at all.

Promoting Biodiversity
If at all, sustainability most likely should influence jurisprudence involving biodiversity, which often engenders related
notions of sustainable and optimum yields, minimizing adverse
environmental effects, species conservation, and even costbenefit analysis. Yet the Supreme Court has yet to consider
sustainability per se in reaching decision in a dispute involving biodiversity. To be sure, decisions issued during the tenure
of Chief Justice Roberts involving biodiversity seem contrary
to sustainability principles. By way of example, the Court has
been unconcerned about sustainability in evaluating impacts on
marine mammals, fish stocks, aquatic habitat, and forest management, discussed below.

Marine Mammals
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council
(“NRDC”),16 the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and ruled 5-4 that the U.S. Navy’s interests in
security and military preparedness outweighs the respondent’s
interest in protecting whales and other marine mammals from
acoustic harm caused by submarine seeking sonar devices.
In Winter, the Court voted to lift a “narrowly tailored” preliminary injunction to enjoin the U.S. Navy’s use of mid-frequency active sonar off of the southern California coast, known
as the “SOCAL exercise.”17 The Navy regards mid-frequency
active sonar as the sole effective means for detecting and tracking enemy diesel-electric submarines. The Navy’s sonar, however, also disrupts marine mammals that rely upon their own
sonar.
The NRDC challenged the Navy’s failure to perform
an environmental impact statement under the National
21

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and attached other claims
under the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) and the
Endangered Species Act.
Finding the “possibility” of causing irreparable environmental harm, the district court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring, inter alia, the Navy to “power down” (1) completely
if marine mammals were spotted within 2,200 yards of Navy
vessels or (2) by seventy-five percent in the presence of other
significant “surface ducting” conditions.
Following the initial grant of preliminary injunction, the
Bush administration then identified the SOCAL exercise to be of
“paramount interest to the United States” and granted the Navy
a waiver from the CZMA. Correspondingly, the White House
Council on Environmental Quality granted the Navy’s request
for “alternative arrangements for compliance with” NEPA due
to a national “emergency.”
Thereafter, the Navy appealed the lower court’s injunction
to the Ninth Circuit. Rather than lift the injunction, the Ninth
Circuit remanded to have the district court weigh the exemption’s impacts on the injunction.
On remand the lower court threw out the “emergency”
premise behind the Council on Environmental Quality’s “alternative arrangements” decision. While finding it “constitutionally suspicious,” the lower court did not rule on the legality of
the waiver of CZMA requirements. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
finding the lower court had not abused its discretion in issuing
the limited preliminary injunction.18 The Ninth Circuit stayed
the injunction’s “power down” provisions, however, allowing
the Navy to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. The Navy still
would be subject to the injunction’s four less restrictive conditions that the Navy did not appeal, including a twelve nauticalmile no-sonar zone along the California coast and enhanced
monitoring requirements.
Writing for the majority, Roberts reversed the Ninth Circuit
5-4 and vacated the injunction and its “power down” requirements on two grounds. First, the majority held that the lower
courts’ preliminary injunction analysis applied an incorrect standard that did not require a sufficient showing of harm. It held
that the lower court should have asked whether the SOCAL
exercise would result in the “likelihood” rather than the “possibility” of irreparable harm, because the “possibility” standard is
“too lenient.”19 Second, it determined the lower courts had given
short shrift to the Navy’s interests in security and preparedness.
Turning to the merits, the Court held first that respondents
had not met their burden of showing irreparable harm. The
Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the Navy’s own
countervailing data, which while both lower courts found to be
“cursory, unsupported by evidence [and] unconvincing,” still
revealed that sonar training had resulted in 564 physical injuries and 170,000 behavioral disturbances of marine mammals.20
The environmental respondents also argued that countless other
reported and undetected mass strandings of marine animals had
been “associated” with sonar training.21 Instead, the Court concluded that the Navy had been conducting sonar training for
forty years without documented cases of irreparable harm.22
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Next, the majority concluded that, properly balanced, the
Navy’s military interests far outweighed respondents’ interest in
protecting and observing marine mammals. It reasoned that balancing the public interest supporting the Navy’s national security and military preparedness against NRDC’s public interest
in protecting marine mammals for observation and education
“does not strike us as a close question.”23 Disagreeing with the
lower courts, the majority found the equities tipped strongly in
the Navy’s favor: “To be prepared for war is one of the most
effectual means of preserving peace.”24 The majority noted
that the president deemed active sonar as “essential to national
security” because adversaries possess 300 submarines. Midfrequency active sonar, the Navy argued, is “the most effective technology” for “antisubmarine warfare, a top war-fighting
priority for the Pacific Fleet.”25 Citing senior naval officers, the
majority observed the importance
of training ship crews with all
possible war stressors occurring simultaneously, thus making mid-frequency active sonar
“mission critical” for training.26
The imposition of the mitigating
regulations would require the
Navy “to deploy an inadequately
trained submarine force,” which
would in turn jeopardize the
safety of the fleet.27 Imposition
of other mitigating factors, the
majority held, could decrease
the overall effectiveness of sonar
training generally. 28 On the
other hand, “[f]or the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury
would be harm to an unknown number of the marine mammals
that they study and observe…” in contrast, forcing the Navy to
deploy an inadequately trained antisubmarine force jeopardizes
the safety of the fleet.”29 The majority concluded that the “public
interest in conducting training exercises with active sonar under
realistic conditions plainly outweighs the interests advanced by
the plaintiffs.”30
Thus the majority found the district court had applied
the incorrect standard and abused its discretion on the merits.
Finding in favor of the Navy, the Court reversed the decisions
below and did not impose the lower court’s “power down”
requirements.31
While the majority did not engage sustainability principles
at all, the dissent concerned itself with just how the SOCAL
exercise affected marine mammals. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented: “In light of the
likely, substantial harm to the environment, NRDC’s almost
inevitable success on the merits of its claim that NEPA required
the Navy to prepare an EIS, the history of this litigation, and the
public interest, I cannot agree that the mitigation measures the
district court imposed signal an abuse of discretion.”32
In particular, Ginsburg had no trouble finding irreparable
harm, and thus, diminution of sustainability. She was dismayed

about how the Court could overlook “170,000 behavioral disturbances, including 8,000 instances of temporary hearing loss; and
564 Level A harms, including 436 injuries to a beaked whale
population numbering only 1,121.” She also observed that,
“sonar is linked to mass strandings of marine mammals, hemorrhaging around the brain and ears, acute spongiotic changes in
the central nervous system, and lesions in vital organs.”33 On
balancing the competing interests of the parties, Ginsburg concluded that these injuries “cannot be lightly dismissed, even in
the face of an alleged risk to the effectiveness of the [Navy’s
training exercises].”34
Charting a more solicitous course, Justice John Paul Stevens, joining Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and
dissented in part. They would have found that neither court
below adequately explained why the balance of equities favored
the two specific mitigation measures being challenged over the
Navy’s assertions that it could
not effectively conduct its exercises subject to the conditions.
They would have remanded for
a more narrowly tailored injunction, but continued the Ninth
Circuit’s stay conditions as the
status quo until the completion of the SOCAL exercise,
thus promoting sustainability to
some extent.35
The postscript is that the
Navy concluded its SOCAL
exercise and completed its
NEPA environmental impact statement for the SOCAL exercise
in January 2009.

None of the environmental
cases decided thus far
during the tenure of Chief
Justice Roberts engage
sustainability.
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Fish Stocks
In Entergy v. Riverkeeper,36 the Supreme Court reversed the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and ruled 5-1-3
that the EPA may conduct a cost-benefit analysis in regulating
the substantial adverse impacts of “cooling water intake structures” under Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act.37 Section
316(b) of the act requires that any standards established for
existing discharge sources ensure that the “design, location, construction and capacity” of any such intake structures “reflect the
best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact.”38
Some thirty years after the enactment of the Clean Water
Act, EPA issued rules applying Section 316(b) to existing
dischargers. The rules allow, but do not require, the use of a
cost-benefit analysis before setting performance-based best technology available standards and in deciding whether to grant sitespecific variances. Cost-benefit analysis is invariably at odds
with sustainability, as it is skewed heavily in favor of industrial
and power producing interests over those in providing access to
sustainable fisheries for future generations.

22

The Second Circuit, in an opinion by then judge and now
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, ruled that the language, structure, and
history of Section 316(b) do not permit cost-benefit analysis. It
then remanded the case to EPA to explain the role, if any, costbenefit analysis played in EPA’s regulations for existing intake
structures.
Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia reversed,
reasoning that Section 316(b), when read together with other
performance-based provisions of the act, gives EPA discretion
to base BTA on a cost-benefit analysis. Scalia relied upon a traditional Chevron two-part analysis. First, he held that Section
316(b) does not contain a plain meaning with regard to costbenefit analysis. To be sure, he held that the word “best” invites
many meanings, including that which “most efficiently produces
some good,” even if the “good” is of a lower quality than other
options.39 He also wrote that “minimize” has many meanings,
and “is a term that necessarily admits of degree [but] is not necessarily used to refer exclusively to the greatest possible reduction.”40 Scalia then found that EPA’s interpretation of Section
316(b) was reasonable because while the provision “does not
expressly authorize cost-benefit analysis,” it does not show “an
intent to forbid its use.”41 Thus,
he wrote, it is “eminently reasonable” to conclude that Congress’
silence on the use of cost-benefit
analysis in cooling tower regulatory cases “is meant to convey
nothing more than a refusal to tie
the agency’s hands as to whether
cost-benefit analysis should be
used, and if so to what degree.”42
Justice Stevens dissented,
joined by Souter and Ginsburg,
advocating a result more consistent with principles of sustainability. Stevens asserted that the
court had “misinterpreted” Section 316(b)’s plain language, and
that the majority “unsettles the
scheme Congress established.”43
According to this view, either the
absence of plain language authorizing cost-benefit analysis, or
congressional silence on the matter, is conclusive, especially in
light of the fact that Congress expressly authorized the use of
cost-benefit analysis with powerplant regulations in other contexts.44 This, Stevens argued, is “powerful evidence” of Congress’ decision not to authorize cost-benefit analysis in Section
316(b).45 In Stevens’ view, the Court “should not treat a provision’s silence as an implicit source of cost-benefit authority.”46
Indeed, quoting Justice Scalia verbatim from another case, he
noted that Congress does not draft fundamental regulatory plans
in “vague terms or ancillary provisions,” and “hide elephants in
mouseholes.”47
Stevens viewed EPA’s interpretation as unreasonable and
outcome determinative: “[I]n the environmental context, in

which a regulation’s financial costs are often more obvious and
easier to quantify than its environmental benefits . . . cost-benefit
analysis often, if not always, yields a result that does not maximize environmental protection.”48
Breyer concurred and presented a middle ground for sustainability, observing that “those who sponsored the legislation
intended the law’s text to be read as restricting, though not forbidding, the use of cost-benefit comparisons.”49 He would have
found that the Clean Water Act’s extensive history demonstrates
Congress’ intent to limit cost-benefit analysis. Quoting the act’s
principal sponsor, Senator Edmund Muskie, Breyer wrote that,
“while cost should be a factor in the Administrator’s judgment,
no balancing test will be required.”50 Formal cost-benefit analysis, he feared, would induce extensive delays and a distorted
emphasis on easily quantifiable factors, running in contrast to the
goal of promoting cheaper, more effective cleanup technology.51

Threatened and Endangered Species
In a case that both pits two of the nation’s more venerated environmental statutes crosswise, and runs counter to
sustainability, the Court decided by a 5-4 majority that EPA’s
delegation to a State of an environmental permitting program
under the Clean Water Act
does not trigger “consultation”
under the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”). In National Ass’n
of Home Builders v. Defenders
of Wildlife,52 an environmental
organization challenged EPA’s
decision that it is not authorized to conduct “consultation”
with federal wildlife agencies to
“insure” conservation of threatened and endangered species
before delegating Clean Water
Act permit authority to a State.
Section 402(b) of the Clean
Water Act lists criteria that if
satisfied dictate that EPA “shall
approve” the State’s authority
to issue permits under the Act.53 These criteria do not include
effects on threatened and endangered species. On the other hand
the ESA impels that federal agencies “shall” “consult” with federal wildlife agencies prior to conducting any “agency action”
“authorized, funded or carried out” by the agency.
Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito upheld
EPA’s “expert interpretation” (and one it changed from an earlier interpretation) that the ESA must yield to the CWA’s permitting authority: “the transfer of permitting authority to state
authorities—who will exercise that authority under continuing
federal oversight to ensure compliance with relevant mandates
of the Endangered Species Act and other federal environmental
protection statutes—was proper.”54 Curiously, the Court held
that Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act only applies to

Two cases decided by
the Roberts’ Court
look to future and past
application of the Clean
Air Act and reach
results that promote
sustainability to some
degree.
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agency actions that are “discretionary.” Because Section 402(b)
is nondiscretionary, Section 7 does not apply, thus diminishing
sustainability.
In so doing, the Court rejected the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions (1) that the ESA, as an independent source of legal authority, trumps the CWA, (2) applying
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,55 in concluding
that EPA’s approval of Arizona’s National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting program was the
legally relevant cause of impacts to threatened and endangered
species resulting from future private land-use activities, and (3)
EPA’s application of the act is arbitrary and capricious.
Stevens, writing for himself and Justices David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer dissented, advocating
a position consistent with sustainability. For that conclusion, the
dissenters relied principally on ESA Section 7’s express application to “all federal agencies” for all “actions authorized, funded
or carried out by them,” and the broad reading of the statute dating back to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.56

Habitat
In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council,57 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
held 5-1-3 that when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issues a
Section 404 permit under the Clean Water Act it displaces otherwise applicable new source performance standards that EPA
applies to pollutant discharges subject to a Section 402 permit.58
This has the effect of eliminating freshwater lake habitat, and
diminishing sustainability.
Coeur Alaska, Inc. sought to open a new gold mine about
forty-five miles north of Juneau, dubbed the “Kensington Gold
Mine,” adjacent to Lower Slate Lake, a “water of the U.S.” in
the Tongass National Forest. The Kensington Mine would use
the froth flotation process, producing over the life of the project
about one million ounces of gold and 4.5 million tons of waste
tailings in the form of waste mill slurry. Coeur Alaska hoped to
discharge the slurry into Lower Slate Lake, the most economically advantageous option. The slurry would consist of about 45
percent water and 55 percent froth flotation mill tailings. Eventually the mine would produce enough slurry to fill the more
than 50-foot depth of Lower Slate Lake, thus converting the 23
acre lake into a 60 acre impoundment. It was undisputed that this
would “destroy the lake’s small population of common fish …”
and other plant and animal life.59
Upholding the Corps’ and petitioner’s less environmentally
protective interpretation, the Court ruled that pollutants that
have the effect of changing the bottom elevation of a body of
water may be regulated as “fill material” instead of “pollutant
discharges” subject to new source performance standards. Consequently, the Court held that EPA has jurisdiction to issue Section 402 permits for discharges into waters except to the extent
that the Corps regulates the permits to constitute a disposal of
“dredge or fill material” under Section 404.
Coeur Alaska pits the Clean Water Act’s two principal permitting provisions against one another. On the one hand, the act
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prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant” except in compliance
with a permit issued under Section 402, including new source
performance standards for categories and classes of pollutant
discharges such as “froth flotation mills” here. Froth flotation
is a process in which raw ore material is ground into fine gravel
and mixed in slurry with chemicals whereby pebbles of desired
metal float to the surface for capture and processing. The polluted “waste mill tailings,” laden with mercury, lead, and other
hazardous heavy metals, however, sink to the bottom, destined
for disposal on land, or as in this case, in a nearby body of water.
EPA’s new source performance standards prohibit discharges
from froth flotation mills.
On the other hand, the Clean Water Act also prohibits the
“discharge of dredge or fill material” except in compliance
with a permit issued under Section 404. The Corps administers
and issues permits under Section 404 in most States, including
Alaska. In 2002, EPA and the Corps issued joint regulations
defining “fill material” as that which “has the effect of changing
the bottom elevation” of a water of the U.S., including mining
slurry.60 “Fill material” includes “slurry, or tailings, or similar
mining-related materials.”61 Thus, the requirements of the act’s
two permitting schemes potentially converge if discharge of a
pollutant, such as waste slurry mill tailings, also has the effect of
raising the bottom elevation of an affected water body.
Because the slurry would have the “effect of raising the
bottom elevation” of Lower Slate Lake, Coeur Alaska sought a
Section 404 permit from the Corps. The Corps accepted jurisdiction, finding that the slurry would be “fill material” instead of a
prohibited “pollutant discharge” from froth flotation mills under
EPA’s New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) rules. It
then issued the Section 404 permit, determining that discharging
the tailings into Lower Slate Lake and eventually converting it
into an impoundment, was the least environmentally damaging
disposal option and was a preferable environmental alternative
to filling adjacent wetlands. Contending that all this constituted
an end run around Section 402 and the applicable zero discharge
NSPS, Southeast Alaska Conservation Council sued to enjoin
the Corps from issuing the Section 404 permit.
The Federal District Court in Alaska rejected the Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council’s position. It held that unlike with
Section 402 permits, new source performance standards do not
explicitly apply to Section 404 permits. Therefore, EPA’s rule
barring froth flotation discharges did not apply once the Corps
assumed jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “§ 404’s silence
regarding the explicit and detailed requirements [that apply to
§ 402] cannot create an exception to those sections’ strongly
worded blanket prohibitions.”62
Notwithstanding the United States’ opposition, the Supreme
Court granted Coeur Alaska’s writ of certiorari. The United
States then joined as a petitioner.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 5-1-3. Kennedy, writing for the Court, upheld the Corps’ interpretation of
the Clean Water Act. First, instead of reviewing the Corps’ interpretation under Chevron,63 Kennedy applied the more searching
24

Mead64 standard of review because, he found, the Corps’ interpretation was not intended to be formal. Nonetheless, Kennedy
upheld the Corps’ interpretation of the Clean Water Act, finding
persuasive the argument that it does not unambiguously apply
NSPS to permits issued under Section 404.
Second, Justice Kennedy held that the Corps properly issued
the Section 404 permit. He observed that “if the tailings did not
go into the lake, they would be placed on nearby wetlands [and]
. . . would destroy dozens of acres of wetlands.”65 Moreover, the
Section 404 permit required Coeur Alaska to cover what used to
be Lower Slate Lake with about four inches of “native material,”
thereby in his view improving the local environment for wildlife
habitat and repopulation.66
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Stevens and Souter,
reasoning that the majority’s reading of the statute “strained
credulity” and creates a “loophole” to NSPS: “A discharge of
a pollutant, otherwise prohibited by firm statutory command,
becomes lawful if it contains sufficient solid matter to raise the
bottom of a water body, transformed into a waste disposal facility. Whole categories of regulated industries can thereby gain
immunity from a variety of pollution-control standards.”67
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent conjured principles of sustainability, observing that it was undisputed that the Section 404
permit, if granted, would “kill all the fish and wildlife” of the
lake, possibly permanently as repopulation was “uncertain.”68
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, believing that too
literal an application of NSPS or too narrow an interpretation of
“fill” or “dredge material” would undermine the purpose of the
statute, and with it, some degree of sustainability.69

National Forests
In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,70 the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held 5-4 that plaintiffs must
establish, with affidavits, knowledge of future injuries to use of
specific tracks of soon to be harvested national forest land to
demonstrate sufficient “concrete and particularized” injury so as
to satisfy constitutional standing under Article III,71 thus having
the effect of diminishing sustainability.
The Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act requires the
U.S. Forest Service to provide advance notice and an opportunity for comment and appeals processes regarding land and timber management decisions for national forests under the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resource Planning Act.72 The Forest Service issued rules that provide a “categorical exclusion”
for activities that in the aggregate do not significantly affect the
quality of the human environment and do not trigger the need for
either an environmental assessment or an environmental impact
statement under NEPA.73
The Forest Service subsequently determined that “fire
rehabilitation” timber efforts involving less than 4,200 acres,
or “timber salvage” involving less than 250 acres, fall within
this categorical exclusion, including a timber salvage sale of 238
acres in the Burnt River Project, an area affected by large fires
that swept through the Sequoia National Forest in California in
2002.74
25

Earth Island challenged both the timber salvage sale for the
Burnt Ridge Project in particular and the Forest Service’s categorical exemption rule in general. The parties subsequently settled the action challenging the Burnt Ridge Project, but pressed
ahead on the legality of the underlying rule as applied nationwide to “many thousands of small parcels.”75 Siding with Earth
Island, the district court blocked the application of the rule.76
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the Forest Service
must allow the public to contest internal administrative decisions on small timber-clearing projects such as the Burnt Ridge
timber sale.77
Without reaching the merits, the Supreme Court held by
another bare majority that Earth Island lacked standing to challenge the application of the rule nationwide, and dismissed the
case.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that Earth Island
did not possess any injury in fact because it had voluntarily settled the portion of the lawsuit pertaining to its only member who
suffered any injury that was “concrete and particularized.”78 The
settlement agreement already fully addressed the procedural
injury alleged by one member who had visited the project site
with plans to return: “[W]e know of no precedent for the proposition that when a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness
of certain action or threatened action but has settled that suit,
he retains standing to challenge the basis for that action.”79 The
majority explained that Earth Island “identified no other application of the invalidated regulations that threatens imminent and
concrete harm” to any of its members who planned to visit sites
where the rules were to be applied.80
Justice Scalia also rejected standing for another affiant who
stated that he had been a long time visitor of Forest Service
sites and would continue to visit sites, some of which would be
subject to the rule. He wrote that the “vague desire to return is
insufficient to satisfy the requirement of imminent injury: Such
someday intentions—without any description of concrete plans,
or indeed any specification of when the someday will be—do
not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our
cases require.”81
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, arguing in favor of a position more consistent with
sustainability. He noted that the majority’s conclusion is “counterintuitive” because a programmatic failure to provide notice,
opportunity for comment, and appeal would eventually and
inevitably cause members to suffer concrete injury.82 “To know,
virtually for certain, that snow will fall in New England this winter is not to know the name of each particular town where it is
bound to arrive,” Justice Breyer wrote.83 “The law of standing
does not require the latter kind of specificity. How could it?”84
In particular, he noted that a “threat of future harm may be realistic even where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times, dates
and GPS coordinates.”85
Justice Breyer also questioned whether the result is consistent with precedent respecting standing for future harm in the
global warming context: “[W]e recently held that Massachusetts
has standing to complain of a procedural failing, namely, EPA’s
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failure properly to determine whether to restrict carbon dioxide
emissions, even though that failing would create Massachusettsbased harm which (though likely to occur) might not occur for
several decades.”86

Cleaning Up Toxic Sites
In Burlington Northern v. United States,87 the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held 8-1 that liability as an
“arranger” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) requires more
than knowledge of chemical spillage; one must intend or plan to
arrange for the disposal at issue. In addition, it held that CERCLA does not impose joint and
several liability when there is a
“reasonable basis” to apportion
liability.88 Neither result promotes sustainability.
In Burlington Northern, a
now defunct company called
Brown & Bryant (“B&B”) once
owned and operated a plant that
stored and distributed agricultural chemicals on land owned
in part by predecessors to petitioners Burlington Northern and
Union Pacific Railroad (“railroads”). B&B obtained some of its
chemicals, including D-D pesticide, from the Shell Oil Company
(“Shell”). Shell would deliver the chemicals by truck for transfer
into large storage tanks onsite. Spills sometimes occurred during
delivery, and the tanks leaked, leading to substantial soil and
groundwater contamination.
Eventually EPA and the State of California investigated,
responded, and then filed suit under CERCLA Section 107(a)
against B&B, Shell, and the railroads as “potentially responsible
parties” for the costs of feasibility studies and response action.
The district court found the railroads liable as owners “at the
time of disposal,” and Shell liable as a “person who . . . arranged
for disposal.” The Court, however, declined to hold the parties
subject to joint and several liability. Instead, it found liability
to be subject to equitable apportionment and set the railroads’
and Shell’s liability at nine and six percent, respectively, which
had the effect of limiting the government’s recovery by about
eighty-five percent.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on liability but reversed on
apportionment. First, it held that although Shell did not qualify
as a “traditional arranger,” it could still be held liable under a
“broader category” if the disposal was a known or foreseeable
by-product of the transaction.89 Second, it reversed the lower
court’s apportionment of liability. The Ninth Circuit instead
held that CERCLA intends for the government to recover full
response costs against targeted parties, envisioning subsequent
civil actions by them against additional potentially responsible
parties for contribution.90
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 8-1 at both
turns, finding Shell had not “arranged for disposal,” and that

joint and several liability is not required when it is practicable
to apportion liability. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens
maintained that “it is . . . clear that an entity could not be held
liable as an arranger merely for selling a new and useful product
if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst to the
seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination.”91 In other words, “arrange” implies action directed to a
specific purpose. Thus, under the statute, “an entity may qualify
as an arranger . . . when it takes intentional steps to dispose of
a hazardous substance.”92 Arranging for disposal must involve
the purpose of discarding a “used and no longer useful hazardous substance.”93 Stevens acknowledged that determining the
arranger’s purpose could involve
a “fact-intensive inquiry.” 94
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis, the Court found Shell
had not arranged for disposal:
“ . . . Shell must have entered
into the sale of D-D with the
intention that at least a portion
of the product to be disposed
of during the transfer process
by one or more of the methods described.”95 Thus, Justice
Stevens concluded, Shell was
not liable as an arranger under CERCLA because it did not
“intend” for its chemicals to be released into the environment,
even though it knew it was delivering its product to a sloppy
operator.96
The Court also held that joint and several liability does not
apply when reasonable apportionment is practicable and upheld
the district court’s initial allocation of liability.97
Justice Ginsburg again urged a position more consistent
with sustainability. She argued in dissent that Shell had arranged
for disposal because it exercised “the control rein” over delivery of the D-D pesticide, specifying transportation and storage
features that resulted in “inevitable” spills and leaks.98 Indeed,
Justice Ginsburg observed, “[t]he deliveries, Shell was well
aware, directly and routinely resulted in disposals of hazardous substances through spills and leaks for more than [twenty
years].”99 Shell arranged to have its chemicals shipped by bulk
tank truckload stored in bulk storage facilities instead of shipping drums.100 Shell knew that spills occurred during every
delivery.101 It also knew about “numerous tank failures and
spills as the chemical rusted tanks and eroded valves.”102
Justice Ginsburg was troubled by the blind eye arrangers
may now turn to chemical transport and storage, emboldened
by the court’s decision: “The sales of useful substances [does
not] exonerate Shell from liability, for the sales necessarily and
immediately resulted in the leakage of hazardous substances.”103
She questioned the Court’s dismissal of joint and several liability, noting that the lower court “undertook an heroic labor” by
apportioning costs without the benefit of briefing—indeed, without even a request to apportion—by the parties.104

In some ways,
sustainability seems
consigned to the elected
branches.
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On the other hand, the Court has issued recent opinions in
this context that seem more consistent with sustainability. In
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,105 the Court unanimously ruled that under CERCLA Section 107(a) private parties not subject to an enforcement action who incurred “other
necessary response costs” may seek cost recovery claims against
“any other person,” including the Federal Government. At issue
in Atlantic Research was whether such a Potentially Responsible
Party (“PRP”) may recover costs from other PRPs under CERCLA Section 107(a) instead of 113(f).106 Likewise, in Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., the Court held CERCLA
does not allow private parties who have voluntarily cleaned up
contaminated property but who have not been the subject of an
EPA enforcement action to recover “contribution” costs from
other responsible parties under CERCLA Section 113(f).107

Waste Flow Control
The Court recently revisited
its dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence in a way that is
more consistent with sustainability. It upheld a county flow
control ordinance that requires
all solid waste generated within
the county to be delivered to a
publicly owned county waste
processing facility. In United
Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 108 the Court
decided that a county’s flow control ordinance does not violate
the dormant commerce clause.
Chief Justice Roberts, for a plurality, applied the Pike balancing test and determined that the ordinance does not violate the
dormant commerce clause because it creates at least “minimal”
local benefits that outweigh whatever “insubstantial” differential burden it may place on interstate commerce: “[W]e uphold
these ordinances because any incidental burden they may have
on interstate commerce does not outweigh the benefits they confer on the citizens of Oneida and Herkimer counties.”109 The
Court rejected the interstate waste hauling companies’ argument
that the ordinance is per se invalid as economically protectionist under Philadelphia v. New Jersey.110 The companies argued
that under C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,111 government instrumentalities may not “hoard wastes” regardless of
whether the “preferred processing facility” is owned by a public entity arguably within the “market participant exception” to
the dormant commerce clause. The plurality disagreed, finding
the public/private distinction is “constitutionally significant.”
Breathing judicial restraint the Court observed: “there is no reason to step in and hand local businesses a victory they could not
obtain through the political process.”112

Pollution Emissions
Two cases decided by the Roberts’ Court look to future and
past application of the Clean Air Act and reach results that promote sustainability to some degree.

Climate Change
In the Court’s initial foray into the global climate change
imbroglio, the Court decided in Massachusetts v. EPA,113 that
Title II of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles that “endanger”
public health or welfare, thereby promoting sustainable air emissions and energy policy. In this case, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and a litany of mostly downwind “blue” States
and environmental organizations contended that EPA improperly exercised its discretion in denying petition by several States
calling for rulemaking to regulate carbon dioxide and three other
greenhouse gas emissions—
methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons—from new
motor vehicles under Title II
of the Clean Air Act. Section
202(a)(1) of the Act directs
EPA to regulate tailpipe emissions that (1) “in his judgment”
(2) “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.” Massachusetts et
al. maintained both prongs had
been met. EPA argued that the
Clean Air Act does not authorize it to regulate emissions to
address global climate change
and that it has discretion not to
regulate based on policy considerations, including foreign policy.114
The Court decided three issues. First, that petitioners
(namely, Massachusetts) demonstrated standing under Article
III of the U.S. Constitution to challenge EPA’s inaction. The
Court held that States enjoy “special solicitude” in demonstrating standing. Second, the Court held that greenhouse gas emissions constituted an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act’s
“capacious definition of air pollutant.” Last, it held that EPA
“offered no reasoned explanation” and that it was arbitrary and
capricious for the agency to refuse to decide whether these emissions “endanger public health and welfare” due to policy considerations not listed in the Clean Air Act, mainly foreign policy.115
In dissent, Roberts questioned Stevens’ “state solicitude”
standard as an “implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing on traditional terms.” Scalia thought the Court
should have deferred to EPA in what he says is a “straightforward administrative-law case,” and that it had “ . . . no business
substituting its own desired outcome for the reasoned judgment
of the [EPA].”116

So perhaps the reason
sustainability doesn’t
exist in the U.S. Supreme
Court is the simplest: it
has yet to be presented to
the Court.
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New Source Review
In the other Clean Air Act case decided the same day,
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.,117 the Court
unanimously held that EPA by regulation could define the word
“modification” differently for different parts of the Clean Air
Act, thereby potentially reducing pollutant emissions and promoting sustainability. The case asks whether the term as applied
to an existing Major Emitting Facility under the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) aspect of the Clean Air Act
refers to “increases” in emission annual quantity or hourly rates.
For the Court, Souter wrote that EPA does not need to harmonize the two regulatory interpretations of the same term. He said
it was reasonable for EPA to interpret the term “modification”
differently in different parts of the statute.118
EPA initially had interpreted the term “modification”
to require New Source Review for any operational or facility changes that result in “increases” in net annual emissions.
Duke Energy contended instead that “modification” under the
PSD program requires an “increase” in hourly emission rates—
as EPA interprets the term under the New Source Performance
Standards aspect of the Act—but does not reach increased hours
of operation and increased annual emissions, and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed. Along the way, EPA
aligned with Duke Energy’s interpretation.
Interestingly, only intervenor Environmental Defense
sought review. Ironically, EPA initially opposed review, only to
rejoin Environmental Defense after the Court granted certiorari,
then joining Duke Energy’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act
as applied to future rulemaking. Environmental Defense agreed
with EPA’s initial interpretation of the Clean Air Act. Duke
Energy is notable insofar as it marks the first time since Sierra
Club v. Morton119 that the Court granted review over the Federal
Government’s opposition, at the exclusive request of an environmental organization who does not enjoy support from a State, as
in Massachusetts v. EPA. In the vast majority of environmental
cases the Court grants review at the behest of State or industrial
petitioners who argue for more constrained application or interpretation of an environmental law. Moreover, past experience
demonstrates that when the Court grants certiorari in a case with
an environmental group, it nearly always rules against the group.
Duke Energy also is perhaps the only case where EPA opposed
a parties’ petition for review only to rejoin it after the Court
granted certiorari, but then only to stake a legal position opposing its original legal position (“increase” in amount, not rate)
and that of co-plaintiff (Environmental Defense), the petitioner.

Discussion
The Court’s environmental cases do not engage sustainability. If anything, they reveal more about its jurisprudential
ideologies than any environmental jurisprudence and invite five
observations. First, the surfeit of sustainability tinged cases does
not necessarily reveal anything about judicial receptiveness to
the concept of sustainability. Rather, these cases are a surrogate
for the jurisprudential ideologies of the Court’s conservative
wing to curtail federal power, promote State’s rights, and protect
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private property rights. If anything, Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas seem to reject principles of
sustainability, except when it becomes a matter of State’s rights.
Yet curiously when the State’s interest is to protect rather than
develop land and environment, such as shoreline loss due to
global climate change, these same justices wonder aloud how it
can be that the State has a sufficient interest to protect. All this
seems counterintuitive because sustainability is a quintessentially “conservative” position insofar as it counsels conservation
and careful consideration of externalized social costs.
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens seem to be much more receptive to notions of sustainability. They argue in favor of greater
consideration of the environmental consequences. Justice Sotomayor may be cut from the same cloth, having written the opinion while sitting on the Second Circuit that the Supreme Court
later reversed in Entergy.
Nonetheless, as Justice Kennedy’s decisions go in cases
implicating sustainability, so goes the Court. Justice Kennedy
voted with the majority—or perhaps more accurately the majority voted with him—in each case that implicates sustainability.
Justice Kennedy almost always votes in a manner that does not
promote sustainability.
Second, the Court may just consider the concept of sustainability to be unworkable. The United States lacks “sustainability
law” per se, so it is not surprising that the Court has failed to
engage sustainability law per se. “Sustainability” does not invite
facile definition or judicially cognizable guidelines. In some
ways, sustainability seems consigned to the elected branches.
Indeed, most of the environmental cases that arguably invoke
sustainability place a premium on arguments cloaked in statutory “plain meaning.” In Atlantic Research, the Court unanimously found that CERCLA Section 107’s reference to “any
other person,” allows cost recovery, indeed, by other PRPs. This
is likely to allow courts to turn to the merits in myriad CERCLA private cost recovery actions working their way through
the federal system. The same plain meaning thread weaves its
way through Duke Energy, in which the Court gave EPA wide
latitude to interpret “modification.” Duke Energy’s ripple effect
looms large, as it potentially subjects more than 100 of the
nation’s largest and eldest coal-fired power plants, and hundreds
of other existing major emitting facilities, including cement kiln
plants, coke ovens, minerals and metals processors, and petrochemical processors, located in Prevention of Significant Deterioration areas, to New Source Review.
Likewise, plain meaning ruled, although only by the slimmest of margin, in both Massachusetts v. EPA and National
Ass’n of Home Builders. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court
promoted the plain meaning of “air pollutant” to include climate
changing gases and that EPA does not have discretion to refuse
to regulate pollutants that “may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.”
In National Ass’n of Home Builders, the Court used plain
meaning in support of elevating the Clean Water Act’s meaning over that of the Endangered Species Act. Section 402(b) of
the Clean Water Act provides “[EPA] shall approve a [state’s
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NPDES program] unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist.” The Court was divided 5-4, however, about
whether the language at issue in these cases is in fact “plain.”
Indeed, Justice Alito’s opinion in National Ass’n of Home Builders arguably ignores the “plain meaning” of a provision of a
more specific and subsequently enacted statutory provision.
Section 7(b) of the ESA provides that: “[e]ach Federal agency
shall, in consultation with [federal wildlife agencies] insure
that any [agency action] authorized, funded or carried out by
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species [or their
habitat].”
Fourth, the Court’s judicial capacity does not invite consideration of sustainability. Article III of the U.S. Constitution
grants federal courts authority to resolve “cases” and “controversies” involving the Constitution, laws of the United States, or
treaties. Sustainability falls into none of these categories. Sustainability is a guiding principle, not a constitutionally enshrined
doctrine. No U.S. law requires or even recognizes sustainability.
And, the United States has not ratified an international treaty
that does so either. Moreover, no member of the Court studied
environmental law. None of them have much if any practical
experience with environmental law in general, and sustainability
in particular. And while some members have regulatory experience, none of the current members have held elected political
office, often the crucible for implementing sustainability. So to
the members of the Court, sustainability is unnoticed.
Finally, and surprisingly, sustainability—even as a governing principle—isn’t the subject of advocacy before the Court.
Supreme Court litigants of every persuasion—government, private, public interest, whomever—ignore sustainability too. As
far as I can tell, no party in any environmental (or any other
case for that matter) has bothered to invoke “sustainability” in
a pleading, brief, or argument.120 Even amici, with much wider
latitude to advocate policy positions not at issue in any claim,
defense or “Question Presented,” have yet to argue that the
Court consider sustainability.121 So perhaps the reason sustainability doesn’t exist in the U.S. Supreme Court is the simplest: it
has yet to be presented to the Court.
Thus, sustainability remains a concept in search of law
subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Without a plain

meaning foothold, therefore, sustainability does not seem to
exist.

Conclusion
Early returns suggest that environmental cases hold interest for the Roberts Court. It already has decided about a dozen
core environmental cases in three years, almost three times the
rate during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Yet, sustainability seems to matter not at all. The Court accepted the business/
industry position in Entergy, Coeur Alaska, and Burlington
Northern, and the government’s less environmentally protective
position in Summers and Winter. In Home Builders, it held that
EPA’s delegation to a State of an environmental permitting program under the Clean Water Act does not trigger “consultation”
under the Endangered Species Act.
The Court seems to be especially interested in reversing
sustainability reinforcing decisions out of the Ninth Circuit.
Indeed, it reversed each of the four cases from that circuit for
which it granted review, cases where the Ninth Circuit arguably
agreed with the pro-sustainable result. It also reversed a Second
Circuit opinion that arguably produced an outcome more consistent with sustainability.
There are some counterexamples. In Massachusetts v. EPA,
the Court held that Title II of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
that “endanger” public health or welfare. In Duke Energy, it held
that EPA by regulation could define the word “modification” differently, and more stringently, in different parts of the Clean Air
Act. In Oneida, a plurality concluded that a county’s flow control ordinance—requiring that all solid waste generated within
the county to be delivered to the county’s publicly owned solid
waste processing facility—does not violate the dormant commerce clause. In Atlantic, it found that under CERCLA Section
107(a) private parties not subject to an enforcement action who
incur “other necessary response costs” may seek cost recovery
claims against “any other person,” including the Federal Government. Each result arguably promotes sustainability.
In sum, the Court seems at worst hostile to, at best agnostic
about, and most likely ignorant of sustainability as a governing
principle.
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